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Centre for Water, Oceans and Sustainability Law, Utrecht University, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article aims to work out the social conditions that determine
whether the communication of river rights finds success in society.
Employing the context of hydropower development in the Mekong
region, the article finds that an essentialist strategy which claims that
river rights have unlimited ‘moral’ validity regardless of any of the
decision consequences is unlikely to succeed. Instead, it is proposed
that moral conflicts over river rights may ultimately only be resolvable
‘unmorally’, that is, by procedural legitimacy – and this is best captured
by employing a methodological framework composed of thematic,
social and temporal dimensions.
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In recent years river rights have gained traction in political discourse not only as a
reaction to unsustainable practices, but also because river rights themselves produce
new violations, and hence new modes of litigation actors can be subject to (Chaturvedi,
2019). The problem is that since river rights are, so to speak, works in progress; nobody
knows exactly what they are. For example, what is their scope: the river, the freshwater
ecosystem, the environment as a whole? And who is to say which jurisdictional
mandate counts? These are just some of the unanswered questions.
At a first glance, one could employ the six fundamental values of the Grant Wilson
Universal Declaration of River Rights (UDRR, 2017a, 2017b):
● The right to flow
● The right to perform essential functions within its ecosystem
● The right to be free from pollution
● The right to feed and be fed by sustainable aquifers
● The right to native biodiversity
● The right to restoration.
Indeed, such normative aspirations provide a useful ‘starting point and baseline standard’
(UDRR, 2017a, p. 3) for constitutionalizing the rights of nature, as exemplified in Ecuador;
triggering new modes of legal action to grant rivers the status of legal personhood to sue or
be sued, as exemplified in New Zealand (O’Donnell & Talbot-Jones, 2018; Youatt, 2017); or
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empowering river activists to oppose the dominance of hydropower ‘productionist-
oriented’ regimes (Blake & Barney, 2018), as exemplified in the Mekong River, which
flows from China to Vietnam crossing six national boundaries (WWF, 2016). That said,
although these six fundamental rights may direct attention to the problem of which values
should be imputed to rivers, this does not mean that concrete blueprints for action will
automatically proceed from them. In fact, due to their abstractness, only picturesque details
in judicial reasoning can be offered to guide the mediation of experience. Why?
Consider an activist lawyer who employs river rights as a normative reflex of human
rights (Kersten, 2017), draws support from the Universal Declaration of River Rights,
and argues that a river’s right to flow is so morally imperative that 'all dams that lack a
compelling social and ecological purpose’ (UDRR, 2017a, p. 3) should be decommis-
sioned, regardless of consequences. What one finds is that the success of the claim
derives not so much from ordaining abstract river right principles but from the state in
which the claim happens to be made at a given time. This means it is not a sender–
receiver (telegraph) model which dictates the claim’s success (for this simply directs
attention to the skilfulness of the lawyer that announces the claim); rather, the claim
must endure a negotiation process akin to a ‘conductor-less jazz orchestra’ (of impro-
visers following each other’s lead), which includes the problem of information and
understanding (Winkin, 2001, cited in Guy, 2018).
In the Mekong region, which this article will employ to illustrate the nuances of river
rights, the problem of promoting interests can be described as follows. On the one
hand, hydropower dam planners today may pay more attention to the articulation of
announced laws, such as the right to equitably utilize water resources, but in 50 years’
time, the repertoire of relevant scientific information may change the contextualization
of these announcements, and hence the understanding of hydropower dam planners.
On the other hand, a river activist today may pay more attention to the articulation of
announced scientific evidence, such as the ecological degradation of river basins caused
by dams, but in 50 years’ time, the repertoire of relevant policy-driven information may
change the contextualization of these announcements, and hence the understanding of
the river activist. The point here is that the significance and meaning of river right
claims derive neither from the truth value of information, nor the expressive behaviour
of an actor’s announcements, nor from a presupposed combination of background
information and articulated announcements which informs us that it is reasonable to
seek understanding and consensus. Rather, the significance and meaning of river right
claims derive from the ‘circular linkage’ of information, announcement and under-
standing – an often hard-won achievement, considering that announcements and
understandings are separated in time by the buzzing, booming, confusing world of
information. How then to come to terms with this complexity?
This article proposes that Niklas Luhmann’s (2004) strictly scientific endeavour to begin
with certainty in the analysis offers an innovative way forward. But in order to acquire this
objective diagnosis, a paradigm shift from normative to post-ideological jurisprudence is
required. This is a shift from normative jurisprudence, which presupposes normative
standards against which to improve practice (Devlin & Devlin, 1965), to post-ideological
jurisprudence, which radically distances itself from ideological positions and normative
standards so as to improve the accountof practice (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009).
Here improve refers to, in the tradition of science, a guarantee ‘at least’ that the account of
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practice is ‘correctly false’ (i.e. investigating what is not true in order to define problems
more specifically). Of course, this aim to begin with certainty in the analysis does not mean
that post-ideological jurisprudence is better than normative jurisprudence: it simply assists
normative jurisprudence by describing practice in a different way from how practice
observes itself. But then what relevance does this have for practice? If relevance is defined
broadly as making a difference, then post-ideological jurisprudence may have no relevance
(because practice might already know what is described). But if relevance is defined as the
reconnectability of practice to a methodological framework composed of the thematic,
social and temporal dimensions, the endpoints of reflection,1 then it could catch the interest
of practitioners, as it gives new contours to the problem of the justification of river rights.
And this is useful because only by defining problems more specifically can one more
adequately describe the social conditions that determine whether the communication of
river rights finds success in society – the research aim of this article, which is to be analyzed
in three parts:
● The thematic dimension articulates the conceptual relevance practice has to social
information systems which enable variation in the assessment of river rights.
● The social dimension articulates the instrumental relevance practice has to the forecast
of communication, namely the expressive behaviour of announced legal arguments
seeking to stabilize the expectations of river rights.
● The temporal dimension articulates the legitimative relevance practice has to the under-
standings of valid river right claims, which is distinguished by whether one pays more
attention to the thematic dimension at points in time, or the social dimension.
In what follows, I first provide a summary of the proposed paradigm shift from
normative to post-ideological jurisprudence. Drawing on the analytical lens of the
latter, I then address the research question by employing a methodological framework
comprising thematic, social and temporal dimensions, with conclusions presented in
the last section.
From normative to post-ideological jurisprudence
How does society induce itself to reflect on the question of the validity of river rights?
At a first glance, the aspiration of normative jurisprudence to improve the practice of
river rights by pursuing some sort of secularized search for redemption through guiding
principles, universal values or categorical imperatives might seem the logical way
forward. However, if one unmasks this ‘cloak of professionalism’ (Mattei & Russi,
2012, p. 267), one finds that the ideals of rationalism are upheld not by identifying
the ultimate justification for river rights but by employing rhetorical ‘shock and awe’
strategies. For example, first moral outrage is created about the unilateral development
of hydropower dams along the Mekong River and their potential destructive impact on
the region’s ecosystem, fishing grounds and the livelihoods of local indigenous com-
munities (Fawthrop, 2018b; Santasombat, 2011; Van Ha, 2012). Then, beautiful coun-
ter-visions are suggested, such as treating rivers as living entities (Yogendran, 2017),
holistic guardianship of river basins (Studley & Bleisch, 2018), and hydrosolidarity as a
potential emancipatory alternative to water conflicts (Falkenmark & Rockström, 2004).
In short, the assumption here is that by embracing the ‘collaborative turn’ in water
governance and its core values of ‘inclusivity, holism and representation’ (Harrington,
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2017, p. 257), humankind can, in accordance with the traditional optimistic ways of
thought, rationally plan or at least decide on its own future (Allmendinger, 2002). But
what happens when one finds that such utopian counter-visions are hard to come by?
Moreover, what happens when one finds that the prevalent reality of our globalized ‘3.0’
world (Friedman, 2006) creates the conditions whereby human actions are increasingly
‘mediated by technological loops, financial opacity, political interests, legal complexity,
and so on’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos & Webb, 2015, p. 447)? Under these circum-
stances, perhaps what we need most is not a more trenchant critique of the crisis at
hand, nor another blueprint for action to patch up problems, but a thoroughly
constructed framework or set of guidelines by which the social landscape of river rights
can be observed and described adequately.
This is where the analytical value of post-ideological jurisprudence can be found: not
because it intervenes in decision making by proving the necessity of river rights claims, but
because it deconstructs, from a normatively neutral stance, how such claims are justified in
the first place. Admittedly, this ‘reflexive form of critique’ (Esposito, 2017, p. 24) does not
lead directly to better principles, guidelines or blueprints for action. But what it can do is
assist normative jurisprudence by improving the account of practice – and doing so in a
manner which leaves legal practice free to do what it deems right, as opposed to having
always to reassure jurisprudence of the foundations of river rights, as claimed by philoso-
phers such as Nussbaum (2005) and Stone (1972).
Due to this non-interventionist stance, post-ideological (or post-philosophical) juris-
prudence does not follow the impulse to react to the issues of river rights with ‘shock and
awe’. This is not to say that it is blind to the suffering that ‘exists on a massive scale and in
such forms that are beyond description’ in today’s world (Luhmann, 2005, p. 269). But what
it can do is warn society of the traps of either overenthusiastic hopes or numbing fears: that
when these themes about river rights appear in society, they are not constructed by groups
of people who then lay down their own particular agendas; rather, they are the result of an
‘information society’ which communicates these hopes and fears via worldwide networks,
yet in a manner which has been neither thought out (in terms of coping with the loss of
central agency) nor understood or accepted in society as one had wished or planned.
To offer an illustration, the ‘mountain cults’ of the Tibetan lay peoplemay trust and hope
that the ghzhi bdag spiritscapes – animistic beliefs which paint the watershed as spiritual
resources, as opposed to an exploitable commodity (Studley & Jikmed, 2016) – grant them
the legitimacy to protect their livelihood practices within governance discourses. However,
this legitimacy does not immediately become part of society until it has been givenmeaning
and significance by one or more social (communication) systems. For example, the ghzhi
bdag spiritscapes have to be recognized by a Buddhist religious system which constructs
communications such as animistic ‘mountain cult’ rituals – and which constantly repro-
duces these experiences through a network of communications – on the basis of its
observational frame, its ritual code (revelation/non-revelation); a legal system which con-
structs communications such as the principle of ‘community participation’, on the basis of
its legal code (lawful/unlawful); a science system which constructs communications such as
best practices of ‘environmental governance’, on the basis of its science code (truth/non
truth); an economic system which constructs communications such as the ‘national
account system’, on the basis of its economic code (pay/non-pay); and/or a mass media
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systemwhich constructs communications such as news broadcasts, on the basis of its media
code (informative/non-informative).2
If one accepts this description, then the ‘sociological insult’ (Moeller, 2012, pp. 19–31)
here is that the ideals of enlightenment, rationality and progress are no longer determined
by individual groups of people, actors or nation-states; rather, it is social systems themselves
that are the genuine ‘medium of Enlightenment’ (Luhmann, 1967, cited in King &
Thornhill, 2003, p. 133). Indeed, this observation dramatically undermines river right
approaches which advocate a more inclusive world according to universal principles,
rational necessity and/or moral obligations. For the issue here is that in a hypercomplex
society where different social systems reconstruct different versions of enlightenment
(indigenous justice, economic justice, juridical justice) and where we humans are con-
strained by the outcome of these unreliable systems, this disturbingly means that nothing
can be described as necessary or problematic any longer in any objective sense (Kang,
2018a). Instead, every individual perspective co-emerges and co-evolves with the particular
requirements of social systems, as exemplified in the systemic rule of rationality, which
determines that all legal observations of river rights takes place first on legal terms, and only
second is recontextualized from an economic, political or indigenous point of view. This is
not necessarily a bad thing, of course, but what it does suggest is that it is social systems, not
people, which actually stimulate and perpetuate the processes of societal rationalization.
Which raises the question: If it is true that each social system uses a different criterion for
success and relevance, but an equally legitimate problem construction and remedial
imperative of river rights, how then to adequately reflect on the social validity of river
rights? The answer, I propose, can be found by employing a methodological framework
oriented to problems, as opposed to normative interests.
Improving the account of practice via methodology
To keep track of the difference between normative and post-ideological jurisprudence, I
propose a methodological framework comprising thematic, social and temporal dimen-
sions. Here the difference is maintained since the framework does not start out with
normatively charged concepts such as water security, sustainability, or hydrosolidarity –
concepts, that is, which typically seek to promote interests.3 Instead, it starts from a
normatively neutral stance, and this is acquired by constructing the framework from the
ground up independent of any scholastic conventions. Indeed, it is through this indepen-
dence that the framework is able to complete its ‘spherical’way of thinking, which is that its
thematic, social and temporal dimensions cannot be isolated empirically. They must be
combined as a unity, just like the Holy Trinity,4 even though they are to be distinguished
analytically to provide three different phases of decision making (Figure 1).
● The thematic dimension articulates the conceptual relevance practice has to social
information systems which enable variation in the assessment of river rights. It is
concerned with bringing conceptual awareness to the form of the ‘black box’5 problem
of different social systems, generating different questions about what constitutes the
validity of river rights.
● The social dimension articulates the instrumental relevance practice has to the forecast
of communication. It is concerned with bringing instrumental awareness to the will-
ingness of legal argumentation – which is more rigid than policies and plans – to guard
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itself against changes that see river rights potentially go against law’s conditional
programme, if X then Y.
● The temporal dimension articulates the legitimative relevance practice has to the under-
standings of valid river right claims. It is concerned with bringing legitimative awareness
to how understandings of validity evolve depending on the emphasis of ordering
(experiencing) the thematic/social dimensions at different points in time.
The contribution of this decision-making framework is that it helps us understand what
interests lie behind the problem/solution constructions of river right claims (thematic
dimension). This in turn helps explain why the promotion of interests becomes a
problem, especially since in detailed planning the number of opposing interests that
suffer increases (social dimension). And the root of this social problem derives from the
temporal dimension, in the various forms of realizing future uncertainty, that is, the
problem of the justification of river rights, as will be explored next.
Figure 1. Decision-making framework on the social validity of river rights.
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Thematic dimension
The thematic dimension articulates the conceptual relevance practice has to social
information systems which offer a repertoire of possible solutions to the problem of
what constitutes river rights. More specifically, this is a ‘black box’ problem derived not
from the content of river rights themselves but from the problem of how social systems
react to river rights. For the empirical observation here is that river rights do not
directly affect river basins themselves; rather, their effects or normative qualities are
always purely socially constructed by social systems. Indeed, if river rights do show up
on the radar of highly distinct social systems such as law, politics, or the economy, they
are often introduced, so to speak, from the sidelines. This is because the underlying
ecological problems which river rights aspire to resolve have no genuine roots in any of
these social systems. Their questions, therefore, can be effectively treated only in
accordance with purely local or system-specific criteria (Borch, 2011). This explains
why each system may have quite a different perspective on river rights, and thus why
systems such as the law find it so difficult to determine their jurisdictional scope.
But these differences in perspective do not necessarily lead to less dynamic dis-
courses. In fact there is more room for dynamism the more that the systemic rule of
rationality kicks in and systems ask the questions that matter to them. The political
system asks how river rights can legitimize (or undermine) the government’s actions.
The law asks how river rights can continue (or discontinue) the law’s requirements for
consistency in decision making. The economy asks how river rights can facilitate (or
inhibit) the cost-saving transactions of freshwater management. The science system
asks how river rights can generate (or block) more research proposals which address the
conditions and effects of river protection. The system of religion asks how river rights
can reinforce (or undermine) the supremacy of religious values. And the mass media
system asks how river rights can satisfy the media’s rigorous selection filters to improve
the prospects that people will watch tomorrow’s news.
That said, although system-specific criteria is the precondition for meaningful river
right discourses, they also create (conceptual) boundaries which prevent systems from
operating outside their own problem trajectories. Science may propose that an ecolo-
gically healthy river is one where the ecosystem has the ability to maintain its structures
and function over time in spite of external stresses (Costanza & Mageau, 1999), but this
cannot be read as such by the legal system, and must instead be transposed into
concepts such as legality. A legal conclusion that a ‘healthy’ river equates to the
environmental standard of ‘not too degraded’ (Kauffman & Sheehan, 2019) may not
map onto topocosmic beliefs that consider rivers spiritual entities. Topocosmic beliefs
cannot be translated directly into terms that are meaningful to the economic system,
except in concepts such as ‘tourism destination reputation’, to allow the economy to
calculate the profitability of monetary investments. The economic rationality of invest-
ment risks posed by the environmental impacts of tourism is not identical to scientific
understandings of risk minimization, or more specifically, ‘ecosystem-based manage-
ment’ (Scrimgeour & Wicklum, 1996). In short, what this description unveils is that
social systems do not have direct inputs and outputs to one another; they cannot
directly steer one another, and they do not share the same perceptions of what ought
to constitute the specific technicalities of river rights.
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Social systems can, nevertheless, complement each other. Although they may
seem independent, and thus increasingly able to follow their own logic, this does
not mean that their dependence on other systems is decreasing. To the contrary, it
is increasing. For example, the politically acceptable threshold level of a hydropower
dams water release for irrigation purposes in the Lower Mekong region will reap-
pear as a factor that reduces or increases profits in the economic world of energy
supply distribution, while the language of profit derived from this energy supply will
reappear in the world of politicians as a limitation on how far promises can be
made to guarantee a river’s right to ‘natural’ flow. Significantly, what this process of
systems feeding into each other and adjusting to each other describes is how each
social system proceeds to reconstruct the unity (‘realness’) of river rights in its own
functionally distinct ways.
Admittedly, this system of checks and balances may also spark conflicts. For river
rights cannot be colonized and isolated according to the functional priorities of any one
dominant system. Instead, systems have to struggle over what exactly constitutes river-
rights-specific technicalities. After all, what is deemed valid in one world might be
invalid according to the logic of another. Take for example the practice of river rights
essentialism and the ‘politics of obstruction’ – ‘no dam building on the river', 'no
blowing up of the river basins rapids', and so on. Nothing prevents Thai politicians,
for example, from demanding or promising a river’s right to native biodiversity
(Nijhuis, 2014). But this is only because they are not obliged to think about or act on
how such actions may affect the economies of upstream states, and do not have to face
the consequences (such as the loss of energy supply and jobs). What matters above all to
the system of Thai politicians is whether these calls to action can maximize or limit the
power of the opposition party. Where is one led by this mode of essentialism? From the
perspective of social contribution, it leads to a situation whereby an involved/unin-
volved spectator is created, one who demands to take part in changes while being
protected from their consequences – a demand, that is, which hardly begins to solve the
problems of the natural environment.
Indeed, if it is true that person-centred moral judgements are increasingly swept
aside by the overwhelming (amoral) priorities of social systems,6 then the underlying
problem is not how to define some sort of ultimate (moral) ground from which all
matters about river rights can be derived; the more analytically useful question is,
what kind of expectational burdens can river rights endure? In other words, how
much monetarization, scientification, politicalization and religionization are river
rights able to generate and cope with, and how much of these specialisms at the
same time (rather than, say, monetarization alone)? The answer is that the imple-
mentation of river rights can only work if the ‘magic triangle’ of political, legal and
the relevant social spheres in regulation can also continue. Only if the political game
is given space to continue, ‘to negotiate land use and value extraction’ (Van Assche,
Beunen, Smit, & Verschraegen, 2015, p. 51), and the regulated social systems are
given space to calculate their own criteria for success and relevance, such as the
monetary calculation of social entrepreneurship in economics (Aikaterini & Hummels,
2019), can decision makers adequately implement river rights – something which legal
processes help manage, as will be explored next.
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Social dimension
The social dimension articulates the instrumental relevance practice has to the will-
ingness of legal argumentation to assume responsibility for the risks involved in
operationalizing river rights. This is best captured in the law’s conditional programme,
the ‘if-then’ formula, which takes on the primary role of ‘formalizing’ normative
expectations: only if fact X is given can it be decided whether Y is legal or illegal. Or
more specifically: only if a rivers’ right to be free from pollution is violated, such as with
the illegal dumping of untreated waste, can the decision of illegality be made. Here the
advantage of employing the conditional programme is that it enables the law to
function as a risk-reducing institution, because it aligns an actor’s expectations and
behaviours long before any serious disagreement arises. In doing so, the programme
therefore provides the possibility that violators face serious sanctions if they do not live
up to the law’s expectations – a possibility which should normally not become relevant
if the legal system fulfils its function properly.
That said, the problem with the conditional programme is that it is input-oriented, as
only the correct identification of what is formalized, or concretized, will lead to a certain
planned legal measure being carried out. In practice, this means that the willingness of legal
argumentation to assume responsibility for operationalizing river rights depends to a large
extent on the principle of voluntariness, which in effect permits states to induce a race to the
bottom and decide only the softest obligations. This is exemplified in the Mekong region
(Hirsch et al., 2006; Johns, Saul, Hirsch, Stephens, & Boer, 2010). Here this race to the
bottom takes a formwhereby river rights cannot go against the established law, as shown in
the conditional programme: only if contract law and international customary norms are
not violated will the law enforce the obligation ‘to protect . . . the ecological balance of the
Mekong River Basin’ (MRC, 1995, Article 3).7 In other words, the extent to which river
rights are legally binding, with enforcement effect, depends on the degree to which other
regulations remain in effect, such as the law on investment property and commercial
navigation – the essential building blocks for development initiatives put forth by organiza-
tions such as the Lancang Mekong Cooperation (Biba, 2018). Thus, it is only realistic to
assume that the established legal framework (which includes environmental law and quality
standards) accommodates the interests of the dominant, since the law could not conduct
itself otherwise, or else lose binding recognition and support from nation states such as
China (as occurred when China refused to join the Mekong River Commission).8
Nonetheless, what is also crucial here is the extent to which the law can be purged of
structural biases, and this is best exemplified when the law attempts to correct its optical
biases by employing purposive programmes.
Purposive programmes are output-oriented: they define fixed goals to be attained, as
exemplified in the formula: to decide Y for the purpose of achieving X. Or in the context of
international customary law: to impose the notification of planned measures, even in the
absence of treaty agreement, to achieve the standard set by the requirement not to cause
significant harm (UNWC, 1997). Of course, from the perspective of legal validity this does
not mean that the no-significant-harm programme is receptive to claims that evolve around
the ‘big questions’, such as actual factual harm caused to rivers (Kang, 2018a). This is
because the no-significant-harm purposive programme, a variant of the conditional pro-
gramme, prescribes that in the event of violation, it is the conduct of state practice, not the
WATER INTERNATIONAL 675
expectation of factual harm, which is wrong.9 Hence, dam development without prior
consultation is forbidden, as claimed for instance in the Pak Beng Dam lawsuit, which
questioned the legality of the power purchase agreement between Laos and Thailand
(Roykaew, 2017). Paradoxically, this also means that what is not forbidden, such as actual
factual harm, is permitted (within reason) – and this is why lawyers and policy makers are
able to speak of ‘fully legally compliant’ hydropower dam projects (Reuters, 2018), and the
subsequent ‘good’ international practices of ‘benefit sharing’ (Suhardiman, Wichelns,
Lebel, & Sellamuttu, 2014).
Admittedly, this does not necessarily mean that the law is just. In fact, the more law
tries to exclude non-legal communications, such as actual factual harm caused to rivers,
the more does the consciousness of this arbitrariness establish itself. This is amplified
when one considers that in a hyper-complex modern society, the established proce-
dures, rules and ‘normal’ rational criteria offer little help, because one is inclined to
expect the improbable (Esposito, 2017). Chinese officials may draw on law and science
to assure Southeast Asia that the Yunnan dams will have a positive environmental
impact in terms of enhanced flood/drought management – but a catastrophe could
always happen tomorrow, because 100% security against these extreme events does not
exist. And here a problem arises because anxiety ‘cannot be regulated legally nor
contradicted scientifically’ (Luhmann, 1989, p. 127). In fact, once the theme of anxiety
gains enough traction that it can no longer be seen in a negative light, such as after the
flash floods of the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy dam collapse in Laos (Fawthrop, 2018a; Sim,
2018), it has the effect of cutting loose the law from its ‘social moorings’ (Luhmann,
2004, p. 162). In other words, anxiety acquires the advantage of replacing the difference
of norm and deviation by forcing the law to yield to the authority of the temporal
dimension, as will be explored next.
Temporal dimension
The temporal dimension articulates the legitimative relevance of practice to the tensions
between the future and past which arise in operationalizing river rights. That is,
between the perceived act of significant harm, and the established legal procedure for
restitution, or in other words, between the eruption of events in the thematic dimension
and the social dimension. But this mode of legitimation awareness is not attuned to the
time-binding arrangements of ‘rational’ solutions (especially where rational means
capable of or requiring consensus). It refers here to the possibility of recognizing errors
in the risk perception of the future, which, under the conditions of ecological moder-
nization, overtakes the past as the meaningful construction of the present.
At a first glance, the essentialist strategy of river rights activism might seem a viable
candidate, as exemplified when Thailand-based activists protest the blasting of rocks in
the Mekong Rivers’ rapids; the media decry the violations; and the government com-
missions feasibility studies (Nation, 2017; Perlez, 2005). But where such essentialism
provides a useful ‘alarm’ function to safeguard society from being aligned with (unques-
tioned) policy objectives, it also generates a social environment whereby either too little
or too much ecological noise is produced. On the one hand, too little noise is produced
because river rights activism tends to get drowned out by information overload.
Consider the possibility that humans and fish that swim in the Mekong River might
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die because is it so polluted. As long as this observation does not become the subject of
communication, it will have no social effect: as the saying goes, pas d’intérêt, pas
d’action (no interest, no action). But if the ecological noise does gain traction, then
the evolution of river rights activism takes on a paradoxical form: the capacity for river
rights to become known and affirmed depends not on the extent of ecological degrada-
tion but on the extent to which river rights are validated by their very violation and
subsequent outcry – and due to the busy and exhausting tasks of daily life, it is never
very long before all this fades into the white noise of the mass media.
On the other hand, river rights activism may produce too much ecological noise, due
to ‘over-engaged’ announcements. The mass media, for example, may turn to science
and announce that it is ‘the weather’ that caused fish to die in Vietnam (VNS, 2017).
This will typically give the general public more knowledge and more ignorance at the
same time: more knowledge because more normative statements are provided, and
more ignorance because such knowledge comes set against a ‘virtual reality’ which is
typically announced metaphorically: ‘is this information manipulated?’ and ‘does this
violate a river’s rights?’ lead to the question, ‘who’s colluding with who?’ And when this
occurs, the individual case becomes uniquely common, so much so that the problem for
the government is no longer the underlying environmental risk: how to minimize harm
to the fish and to the river’s integrity. It becomes a conflict between decision makers
and those affected, whereby the government, due to the fear of political revolt, is forced
to focus on its own legitimacy – a distraction which may result in episodes of state-
linked violence, as observed in the discourses surrounding the Pak Mun Dam (Foran &
Manorom, 2009).
Viewed in this way, one can see that river rights essentialism generated from protest and
dissidence is not particularly helpful in legally prohibiting the environmental degradation
of river basins. It may actually obstruct the acceptance of laws, because it pretends to go
beyond the established juridical world, and thus be more than law. For what drives its
implementation is not the functioning of law’s code, legal or illegal – what counts is
humanity. And the error here is that river rights essentialism which tries to impose itself
on the law, or even ignore the law (e.g. by assuming that everybody wants a naturally free-
flowing river, not a dammed-up river, which violates the principle of consultation), is not
actually a solution but a disappointment-ridden mode of conflict resolution. Why? It is
because this lethargic attitude to the law pressures politics into politicizing risks of all kinds
which, in this era of unsustainable co-evolution (Kang, 2018b), politics can no longer
resolve. This is not to say that river rights should be given up; their practical implications,
after all, serve the important function of protecting rivers from ecological degradation. But
how then to give legitimacy to the communications of those whose actions count on the
belief that river rights are socially valid?
This is the point where the return to legal technique, the management of differences
between the perceived act of harm and established legal procedure, shows its potential.
Here a viable candidate is the granting of legal personality to rivers. Granting rivers (as
legal persons) organizational representatives and giving them rights and duties offers an
advantage because these representatives are socially addressable. In principle, this form
does not cause any general problems, because the unlawful (representatives) can always
be legalized if they are imported into the law and regulated. Of course, the structural
biases of law’s social dimension will resist the personification of rivers, because granting
WATER INTERNATIONAL 677
them rights and duties via representatives could go against the established law. But the
law cannot go on as if nothing has happened. This is because the personification of
rivers perturbs general expectations in the thematic, social and temporal dimensions.
From the perspective of the thematic dimension, legal personhood for rivers, such as
the Whanganui River in New Zealand (more specifically, the 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act,
clause 38, prioritizing regulatory conformity with Maori practices), sets a precedent for
other jurisdictions. The effect here is that the more that such rules are implemented,
and the more this becomes the norm rather than the exception, the greater are the
reputational risks for jurisdictions that resist personification.
From the perspective of the social dimension of law, the validity of granting a river
legal personality depends on existing rules. But the personification of a river challenges
this structural bias not because it pushes the establishment to the point that it bursts,
but because it works against it from the inside: it absorbs the undecidability of political
conflicts that evolve around rights, resistance and dissent into, at least in the world of
law, decidable technical inquiries about representation, participation and the judiciary
of ‘citizens’ tribunals’ (GARN, 2009).
Finally, from the perspective of the temporal dimension, giving legal personality to
rivers keeps the future open to all possible preferences, such as shifts in balancing river
rights with the ‘right to water’, or the ideological fault lines over whether animistic
worldviews should be protected only if they contribute to conservation outcomes (Jonas
et al., 2017). This is crucial not only because it enables the law to ‘catch up’ with its
social environment, but also because it maintains the law’s presentation that its opera-
tions are not in fact based on structural biases. Indeed, only by maintaining this
presentation that the law is legitimate, just and fair can it paradoxically maintain
legal security, stabilize expectations and pacify conflicts.
Conclusion
This article aims to work out the social conditions that determine whether the com-
munication of river rights finds success in society. Employing the context of hydro-
power developments in the Mekong region, we find that an essentialist strategy which
claims that river rights have unlimited ‘moral’ validity regardless of consequences is
unlikely to succeed in society. This is because from the perspective of social contribu-
tion an essentialist strategy is not revolutionary but conservative, since it neglects the
all-important problem trajectory structures of social systems.
To come to terms with this complexity, I propose a paradigm shift from normative
to post-ideological jurisprudence. Where normative jurisprudence pursues the search
for the ultimate (moral) foundation of river rights (often with spectacular disappoint-
ments), post-ideological jurisprudence recognizes that moral conflicts over river rights
may ultimately only be resolvable ‘unmorally’, that is, by procedural legitimacy, as
captured in the proposed decision-making framework (Figure 1).
● The thematic dimension articulates the conceptual relevance practice has to the various
(amoral) social information systems, such as politics, economics and science. It is
concerned with bringing conceptual awareness to the form of the ‘black box’ problem,10
of different social systems generating different questions about what constitutes the
validity of river rights.
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● The social dimension articulates the instrumental relevance practice has to the expres-
sive behaviour of announced legal arguments. It is concerned with bringing instrumen-
tal awareness to the willingness of legal argumentation to guard itself against changes
that see river rights potentially go against law’s conditional programme, if X then Y.
● The temporal dimension articulates the legitimative relevance practice has to the under-
standings of valid river right claims. It is concerned with illuminating why validity lies
not in essentialism (where one presupposes an ordering of the thematic/social dimen-
sion to justify ultimate (moral) grounds) but in the principal impossibility in modern
society of predicting who can say which normative interests count.11
And it is precisely this operation of law, to keep the future open against all final
judgements, which granting rivers legal personality facilitates: not because this legal
technique repairs social problems directly, but because it absorbs uncertainty; because it
enables society to deal with problems, to inquire about what questions one should ask
the other,12 without risking the freezing side-effects of confronting and solving pro-
blems directly. Indeed, giving rivers rights as juristic/legal persons or living entities may
have vital functions, even if it is only on the symbolic level.
In sum, when one combines the thematic, social and temporal dimensions into a
singular decision-making framework, the insights offered are not impractical orienta-
tions which one cannot seriously recommend, let alone put into practice. After all, what
is contributed is a creative lateral way of thinking, which advises that when things fall
short, perhaps it is more rewarding not to look for better solutions to problems –
problems that are constructed by the mass media – but to ask instead, ‘What is the
problem in the first place?’ This does not mean simply reiterating the ways in which
multiple sovereign borders and jurisdictions structurally disconnect communications,
nor does it mean ordaining a narrow criticism of the asymmetry between river rights
and prevailing hydropower development agendas in regions such as the Mekong River.
Rather, the ‘critical attitude’ (Esposito, 2017) here is that by defining the problem of the
justification of river rights more specifically, one can more adequately describe the
social conditions that determine whether the communication of river rights finds
success in society or not, as can be summarized as follows: only if the social environ-
ment of systems calls for positive ecological reputation (thematic dimension) will law
and politics show leadership in implementing river rights (social dimension); but when
negotiating the specifics, it is the perceived risk of the future where authority is found
(temporal dimension). And whose guesses about the future validity of river rights are
correct – well, that is a question of who is in power.
Notes
1. In the sense that these dimensions are the definitive lines beyond which one starts to lose
analytical power. Accordingly, I draw support from my interpretation of Luhmann’s
offhand comparison with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The Father is the world of
information (thematic dimension); the Son, the reality of announcements (social dimen-
sion); and the Holy Spirit, how the meaning of the Father and Son is acquired through the
evolution of understanding (temporal dimension). For further details see Rasch (2013).
2. For more details on this non-exhaustive list of social systems, see Roth and Schütz (2015).
3. In the sense that these concepts typically seek to show why the particular interests are the
common interest, or at least cover many other interests as well.
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4. See note 1.
5. Here ‘black box’ articulates the problem of working out what lies inside a system which
cannot be recognized because it is too complex.
6. In the sense that each social system employs an amoral code of rationality, such as legality
in law, efficiency in economy, or risk minimization in science.
7. See for example Article 36 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement (MRC, 1995).
8. For more details, see Ho (2014).
9. As McCaffrey (2001, p. 347) points out, the rule regarding no significant harm ‘is not
factual harm per se but injury to a legally protected interest that the law prohibits’.
10. See note 5.
11. As Přibáň (1997, p. 345) supports, that ‘law is legitimate to the extent to which it is open to
outside critique; by different vocabularies and language games’.
12. Procedural right questions such as the right of information, the right to participate and the
right of access to justice, or substantive right questions such as a rivers’ right to be
protected from pollution to maintain its good ecological status. For more details, see
Wuijts et al. (2019).
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